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Abstract—Due to high homogeneity of current network devices, 
a network is compromised if one node in the network is 
compromised by exploiting its vulnerability (e.g., malicious 
packets attack). Many existing works adopt heterogeneity 
philosophy to improve network survivability. For example, 
“diverse variants” are assigned to nodes in the network. However, 
these works assume that diverse variants do not have common 
vulnerabilities, which deem an invalid assumption in real 
networks. Therefore, existing diverse variants deployment 
schemes could not achieve optimal performance. This paper 
considers that some variants have common vulnerabilities, and 
proposes a novel solution called Vulnerability-aware 
Heterogeneous Network Devices Assignment (VHNDA). Firstly, 
we introduce a new metric named Expected Infected Ratio (EIR) 
to measure the impact of malicious packets’ attacks spread on the 
network. Secondly, we use EIR to model the vulnerability-aware 
diverse variants deployment problem as an integer-programming 
optimization problem with NP-hard complexity. Considering 
NP-hardness, we then design a heuristic algorithm named 
Simulated Annealing Vulnerability-aware Diverse Variants 
Deployment (SA-VDVD) to address the problem. Finally, we 
present a low complexity algorithm named Graph 
Segmentation-based Simulated Annealing Vulnerability-aware 
Diverse Variants Deployment (GSSA-VDVD) for large-scale 
networks named graph segmentation-based simulated annealing. 
The experimental results demonstrate that the proposed 
algorithms restrain effectively the spread of malicious packets 
attack with a reasonable computation cost when compared with 
baseline algorithms. 
 
Index Terms—network device, malicious packets attack, 
diversity, simulated annealing 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
N traditional networks, network devices (e.g., switches and 
routers) exhibit high homogeneity due to some practical 
considerations (e.g., simplifying network operation and 
maintenance, unifying operator training, reducing complexity, 
and enhancing interoperability). However, such network device 
may suffer serious security threats. For instance, as soon as one 
node is compromised, the entire network will be subsequently 
compromised. 
Malicious attackers exploit vulnerabilities and bugs behind 
network devices to launch attacks. These attacks result in 
significant information leakage from networks, normal 
operational interference, and even worse network destruction. 
Recent studies show that the current network devices are 
vulnerable to various attacks, such as a DNS spoofing attack 
[1], information exposure [2][3], Denial of Service (DoS) 
attack [4][5], buffer overflow attack [6][7], and stored 
cross-site scripting (XSS) attack [8]. The problem would be 
more serious as more new attacks are generating increasingly 
and evolving at a rapid pace. Malicious packets attack is a 
severe attack to crash and/or control nodes. In a network with 
homogenous devices, a malicious packets attack can send a 
single message to compromise the entire network.  
To address this problem, some researchers are inspired by 
the survivability through heterogeneity philosophy [9] and have 
investigated the technique of diversity to prevent the 
propagation of malicious packets attack. Different network 
devices’ vendors use different techniques and implementation 
methods (i.e., in terms of hardware, software and operating 
system) to provide services. In this paper, we define variants as 
the different implementations of the same function. We take the 
operating system as an example. For simplicity, we use 
“operating system variant” and “variant” interchangeably. If 
the number of variants is large enough, each node can have a 
unique variant. However, the number of variants is limited in 
the real condition. Efficiently assigning limited variants to 
nodes is critical to the defense efficiency, which is named 
diverse variants deployment problem. Existing works 
formulate the problem as a graph coloring problem with an 
objective to minimize the number of defective edges, whose 
two endpoints have the same variant, while maximizing the 
number of disconnected components. These approaches can 
achieve a satisfactory defense performance when diverse 
variants are completely independent. However, these works 
assume that diverse variants do not possess common 
vulnerabilities, and thus, malicious packets’ attacks cannot 
propagate among different nodes. This assumption is not 
always valid. Heterogeneous variants may have common 
vulnerabilities since different network device vendors reuse the 
same code for different devices. For instance, using a 
third-party library may already contain vulnerabilities [10]. 
Attackers could compromise distinct nodes by exploiting 
common vulnerabilities among the nodes. In this case, 
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malicious packets attacks can continue propagating even 
though the adjacent nodes are heterogeneous, and the existing 
solutions cannot efficiently prevent such malicious packets 
attack. 
 In this paper, we devise a novel solution named 
Vulnerability-aware Heterogeneous Network Devices 
Assignment (VHNDA) that effectively deploys diverse variants 
to nodes in order to restrain the propagation of malicious 
packets attack in the network. By this solution, the network can 
effectively defend against the propagation of malicious packets 
attack because the proposed solution can use the correlation 
information between variants. To achieve the proposed 
solution, white box switches can be a feasible choice. Different 
from conventional switches, users can run any network 
operating system software in a white box switch on demand, 
which enables users to design and configure the network 
flexibly. In this way, the heterogeneity of network devices can 
be realized. 
The main contributions of this paper are summarized as 
follow: 
1. New metric for packets attack. We first analyze 
potential attack events with the assumption that diverse 
variants have common vulnerabilities. Then, we devise 
a metric named Expected Infected Ratio (EIR) that 
quantitatively measures the malicious packets attack 
propagation’s impact on the network. Besides, we 
design a method using the connected graph to efficiently 
calculate EIR. 
2. Problem formulation. Based on the above-mentioned 
metric, we propose the Vulnerability-aware Diverse 
Variants Deployment (VDVD) problem and formulate 
the problem as an integer-programming problem with 
NP-hard complexity.  
3. Efficient algorithm design. We use simulated annealing 
to efficiently solve the problem and present a graph 
segmentation-based simulated annealing to achieve the 
tradeoff between computational complexity and 
network scalability. It is proved theoretically that the 
graph segmentation-based simulated annealing method 
can reduce the computational complexity. 
4. Simulations verification. We conduct experiments to 
verify the validity of the proposed algorithms in terms of 
various aspects (e.g., coloring algorithms, compromised 
probability, inaccurate information and topology size).  
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. The attack 
model and motivation of the work are introduced in Section II. 
In Section III, we discuss the overview of the proposed scheme; 
followed by the formulation of VDVD problem in Section IV. 
Section V discusses the proposed two solutions to the problem 
of different scales of network. Section VI shows the 
experimental evaluation and analyses the results gained from 
the experiments. Section VII presents the related work followed 
by Section VIII that concludes the paper and paves the way for 
the future work. 
II. ATTACK MODEL AND MOTIVATION   
A. Attack Model  
First and foremost, we assume that it is not possible to make a 
network device completely immune to malicious attacks. Put it 
simply, an attacker can find the vulnerabilities behind a 
network device to launch a malicious attack. The attacker can 
destroy simultaneously the network devices with the same 
operating system. In this paper, we focus on a malicious 
packets attack. We define a malicious packet as a crafted 
message that exploits the buffer overflow vulnerability of 
nodes.  
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Fig. 1 The spreading process of malicious packets attack 
 
Fig. 1 shows the spreading process of malicious packets 
attack. A buffer overflow vulnerability, which is the common 
trigger of attacks, may cause transferring program flow to a 
transmission component in the code space. Then, an exploited 
node may relay the attack packet it received before becoming 
irresponsive. This leads to the propagation of the malicious 
packet over the entire network which causes failure/corruption 
of all nodes in the network. Different from the assumption in 
the literature, we assume that there are common vulnerabilities 
between different variants. Thus, a malicious packets’ attack 
can propagate if there are common vulnerabilities between the 
infected node and its adjacent nodes. 
B. Motivation  
We exemplify different variant deployments using a simple 
network that has 5 nodes and 3 software variants. In the below 
figures, a circle denotes a node, a circle with a cross indicates a 
node infected by a malicious packets’ attack (infected node for 
short), and circles with different filling patterns indicate nodes 
with different variants. Left slash indicates variant A, 
horizontal line indicates variant B and right slash line indicates 
variant C. For example, in Fig. 2 in which the initial injected 
node is node 1, 2(a) has one variant A, and 2(b) has three 
variants: A, B and C.  
Fig. 2(a) shows the spread of malicious packets attack under 
homogeneity deployment, in which all nodes are assigned with 
the same variant A. Due to the homogeneity of nodes, the entire 
network would be infected if only one node is injected. 
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(c) Malicious packets attacks spread under correlation-aware heterogeneity 
deployment 
 
Fig. 2 Malicious packets attacks spread under different deployment  
 
In the same vein, Fig. 2(b) shows diverse variants assigned to 
nodes using the existing heterogeneity deployment, and the 
variants of adjacent nodes are heterogeneous. In the figure, the 
variants are deployed in the following form: A is on nodes 1 
and 3, B is on nodes 2 and 4, and variant C is deployed on node 
5. We study specific attack cases where common vulnerabilities 
exist in different variants. For example, exploited vulnerability 
exists in variants A and B. Hence, malicious packets attack can 
propagate even though the adjacent nodes are heterogeneous. In 
Fig. 2(b), since the exploited vulnerability belongs to the 
common vulnerabilities between A and B, a malicious packets 
attack contaminates nodes (1–4). Hence, we perceive that 
deploying different variants on adjacent nodes cannot 
effectively restrain malicious packets attack spread in the 
network. In the same vein, Fig. 2(c) depicts the spread of 
malicious packets attacks under correlation-aware 
heterogeneity deployment. In Fig. 2(c), variant A is deployed 
on node 1 and 4, variant B is deployed on node 2 and 5, and 
variant C is deployed on node 3. Thus, malicious packets attack 
only contaminates nodes 1 and 2. 
Therefore, the existing diverse variants deployment cannot 
effectively prevent the spread of malicious packets attacks. 
This paper proposes a novel diverse variant deployment to 
restrain the propagation of malicious packets attack in the case 
of a realistic situation. 
III. SCHEME OVERVIEW  
Fig. 3 depicts the workflow of the proposed 
Vulnerability-aware Heterogeneous Network Devices 
Assignment (VHNDA) solution. It comprises of two modules: 
the EIR calculation, and VDVD problem solving. 
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Fig. 3 The workflow of VHNDA 
 
In the EIR calculation module, we analyze the potential 
attack events, and calculate a metric named EIR to measure the 
impact of malicious packets attack propagation based on the 
network information (e.g., topology information and flow 
state), which obtained periodically from network devices. Since 
the characteristic of malicious packets attack propagation is 
similar to the conception of the connected component, we 
propose a connected component-based algorithm to calculate 
the EIR. In the VDVD problem solving module, we propose 
two algorithms, SA-VDVD and GSSA-VDVD, for different 
scale networks. We, first, formulate the VDVD problem as an 
integer-programming problem with the objective to minimize 
the EIR while satisfying constraints. Due to the NP-hardness of 
the problem, we propose a SA-VDVD algorithm for 
medium-scale networks. Considering that the computational 
complexity will significantly rise with the increase of network 
size, we also present a low complexity algorithm named 
GSSA-VDVD for large-scale networks. 
IV. THE DIVERSE VARIANTS DEPLOYMENT PROBLEM 
FORMULATION 
This section starts with an introduction to the system 
description; then, analyzes the potential attack events and 
presents a metric named EIR to measure the impact of 
malicious packets attack spread.  
 4 
A. System Description  
TABLE I  
NOTATIONS  
Symbol Description 
V  Set of network devices. Represented by circles 
in figures 
L  Set of edges in the network 
S  Set of variants. Represented by filling patterns 
of circles in figures 
n  Number of nodes in the network 
m  Number of edges in the network 
  Cardinal number for set 
is
E  Set of all the potential events that the malicious 
packets attack can propagate in the case that the 
incipient injected node belongs to variant
i
s  
i
A  Set of vulnerabilities for variant
i
s  
i
d  Size of
i
A  
j
i
w  Binary. j
i
w is 1 if variant
j
s is deployed onto 
node i and 0 otherwise 
i
h  The weight for node i  
( )X i  The variant deployment of node i . ( )X i S  
( )X i
e
P  The probability that event e occurs in the case 
that the initial injected node belongs to 
variant ( )X i  
( )X i
E  Set of all the potential events that the malicious 
packets attack can propagate corresponding to 
the case that the variant type of incipient 
injected node is ( )X i  
,
( )
D e
i  Number of infected nodes in the case that 
node i is initially infected for a given 
deployment D and a compromised variant 
event e  
,
( )
D e
r i  The infected ratio for a given 
deployment D and a compromised variant 
event e  
D
R  EIR 
h
D
R  The weighed EIR  
 
The network topology is modeled as a graph ( , )G V L , 
whereV denotes the set of all nodes corresponding to network 
devices, and L is the set of edges representing links between 
network devices. Suppose that there are n nodes and m edges in 
the network, such that n V and m L . 
Also,  1 2, , , kS s s s is a set of k  software variants. TABLE 
I lists the symbols used in the problem statement and 
formulations in section IV.  
B. The Probability of Potential Attack Events 
An attacker can exploit a number of vulnerabilities in each 
variant. Let  1 2, , , idi i i iA a a a be the set of vulnerabilities for 
variant
i
s with size of i id A . For simplicity, we assume that 
an attacker employs only one vulnerability to launch an attack.  
Let  1 2= , , ,is kE e e e be the set of potential events that 
malicious packets attacks can propagate corresponding to the 
case that the variant type of incipient injected node is
i
s . The 
main idea of calculating the probability is to count up the 
vulnerabilities corresponding to the attack event. Note that, the 
probability for each potential case is related to the variant 
incipient injected nodes. We take the case that the incipient 
injected node belongs to variant
1
s as an example to present the 
calculation. 
Next, we describe how to calculate the probability by the 
example of three variants. In this case, 
is
E can be expressed 
as         1 1 2 1 3 1 2 3, , , , , , ,s s s s s s s s . As shown in Fig. 4, 
 1s means that only variant 1s is compromised;  1 2,s s means 
that only variant
1
s and
2
s are simultaneously compromised; 
 1 3,s s means that only variant 1s and 3s are simultaneously 
compromised; and  1 2 3, ,s s s means variant 1 2 3, ,s s s are 
simultaneously compromised. Let 1s
e
P be the probability of 
event e in the case that the incipient injected node belongs to 
variant
1
s . Let A B  be the difference set in which elements 
exist in A but not in B . Therefore, the formal expressions are as 
follow: 
 
 
1
1
1 2 3
1
s
s
A A A
P
A
 
   (1) 
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1
1 2
1 2 1 2 3
,
1
s
s s
A A A A A
P
A
   
   (2) 
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,
1
s
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A A A A A
P
A
   
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Fig. 4 Depiction of different potential events when the incipient injected node 
belongs to variant
1
s  
C. Measuring the Impact of Malicious Packets Attack 
Propagation 
We devise a metric named EIR which is defined as the 
expected value for the proportion of infected nodes to measure 
the impact of malicious packets propagation. Let j
i
w  be the 
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binary variable indicating whether variant
j
s is deployed onto 
node i . Let  , [1, ]ji iW w j k  be the variant placement vector 
for node i . The variant placement can be indicated 
as  ,iD W i V  . Specifically, for a given deployment D and a 
compromised variant event e , numerous nodes are infected 
after a period of time. Let
,
( )
D e
i be the number of infected 
nodes in the case that node i is initially infected. Then, the 
corresponding infected ratio can be expressed as follows, 
 
,
,
( )
( )
D e
D e
i
r i
n

   (5) 
In fact, it is a persistent process that malicious packets 
propagate. In this paper, we do not consider the concrete 
propagation process, but we focus on the final decisive effect of 
the malicious packets spread on the network. Furthermore, we 
present a method to count the number of infected nodes. 
A novel graph
,D e
f
G is generated according to the given 
deployment scheme D and the current compromised event e . 
For each node i V , if ( )X i e , then node i will be inserted 
to
,D e
f
G . For the inserted nodes, if there exist links between 
inserted nodes in previous graph G , then these links remain 
in
,D e
f
G . In fact, not all the nodes in
,D e
f
G will be ultimately 
infected. If there are no paths between two nodes, at least one 
node will not be infected. Intuitively, the characteristic of 
malicious packets attack propagation is similar to the 
conception of the connected component which is defined as a 
subgraph where any two vertices are connected to each other by 
paths. Thus, we can adopt connected components to analyze the 
final infected nodes. Let
,
( )
D e
f
C i be the connected component 
of
,D e
f
G containing the initial infected node i . Then, the number 
of final infected nodes in the network can be defined as the 
number of nodes in
,
( )
D e
f
C i . Thus Equation (5) can be rewritten 
as, 
 
,
,
( )
( )
D e
f
D e
C i
r i
n
   (6) 
Algorithm 1 details the process of calculating
,
( )
D e
r i  
 
Algorithm 1 Calculating infected ratio
,
( )
D e
r i  
Input：a given deployment  ,iD W i V  , the current 
compromised event e , the original graph G  
Output: infected ratio
,
( )
D e
r i  
1:  initialization 
,
( , )
D e
f
G V L   
2:  for each node i V do 
3:    if  ( )X i e  then 
4:      insert node i intoV  ; 
5:    end if  
6:  end for 
7:  for each node i V  do 
8:    for each node j V  do 
9:       if  ( , )l i j L  then 
10:        insert link ( , )l i j into E  ; 
11:      end if 
12:   end for 
13: end for 
14: for each node i V  do 
15:   obtain by calculating the connected component 
of
,D e
f
G containing node i ; 
16:   ,
,
1
( ) ( )
D e
D e f
r i C i
n
 ; 
17: end for  
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Fig. 5 The process of calculating infected ratio 
 
We exemplify the process of calculating infected ratio using 
a sample network in Section II. Suppose that the initial injected 
node is node 1. As shown in Fig. 5, variant A is deployed on 
node 1 and 4, variant B is deployed on node 2 and 5, and variant 
C is deployed on node 3. We consider a specific attack case that 
the attacker exploits the vulnerability existing in variants A and 
B to launch an attack. It can be seen that node 1, 2 and 5 may be 
attacked. There is no single path between node 1 and 5, the 
same case between node 2 and 5. Thus, node 5 will not be 
infected. 
Considering all the initial injected nodes and various 
compromised events, the EIR can be expressed as, 
  
( )
( )
, ,1
1
( ) ( )
X i
n X i
D D e e D ei e E
R E r i P r i
n  
        (7) 
where ( )X i
e
P represents the probability of event e in the case that 
the initial injected node belongs to variant ( )X i , 
( )X i
E indicates 
the set of all the potential events that malicious packets can 
propagate corresponding to the case that the variant type of 
incipient injected node is ( )X i .  
The EIR
D
R assumes that all the nodes in the network are 
equally important. In fact, this assumption is not realistic; in 
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real cases, it is hard to satisfy this assumption as some nodes are 
more significant than the others. For instance, a node can be 
regarded as vital when it carries more traffic. Alternatively, a 
node with a higher degree, which means the node connects to 
more customers, can be considered significant. This paper 
measures the importance via assigning different weights to 
different nodes in the network. We use the degree of node to 
represent the weights. 
Now, we extend the EIR by considering the node importance. 
Therefore, the weighed EIR is rewritten by replacing the 
factor 1
n
with weight factor
i
h , 
  
( )
( )
, ,1
( ) ( )
X i
nh X i
D D e e i D ei e E
R E r i P h r i
 
        (8) 
where
i
h is the weight for node i . Obviously, Equation (7) is a 
special case of Equation(8). Thus h
D
R can be regarded as the 
universal metric. 
D. Problem Formulation  
The VDVD problem aims to find the optimal variant 
assignment for each node in the network in order to prevent 
malicious packets spread. Our objective is to devise a 
deployment or mapping :M S V while minimizing the EIR.  
We formulate the VDVD problem as follows, 
  
( )
( )
,1
min ( )
X i
n X i
e i D ei e E
P h r i
     (9) 
subject to 
  0,1 ,ji jw i V s S      (10) 
 1
j
j
is S
w i V

     (11) 
 ( ) , 1j
i
X i j if w    (12) 
In the above formulations, Equation (10) indicates that the 
variant deployment for nodes must be one of the only two 
statuses including completely a software variant or completely 
not of that variant. It is not allowed that a part of variant is 
deployed onto one node. Equation (11) represents only one 
variant can be deployed on a certain node in the network. 
Equation (12) shows the relationship between ( )X i and j
i
w . In 
the VDVD problem, the possible values of variables are 0 or 1, 
thus it is a typical integer-programming problem.  
V. SOLUTION 
In this section, we propose two algorithms for different scale 
networks: SA-VDVD and GSSA-VDVD. The following 
subsections discuss these algorithms and the complexity 
analysis of them.   
A. SA-VDVD algorithm 
Obviously, the VDVD problem is an integer-programming 
problem. It is difficult to solve such a problem due to its nature 
of NP-hard. The computational complexity of the brute force 
solution that exhausts all possibilities in the search space 
is ( )nO k , where n is the number of nodes in the network 
and k is the number of available variants. It is impractical to 
employ the brute force solution when n and k are huge.  
In this work, we resort to simulated annealing (SA) [11] 
which is regarded as an effective probabilistic searching 
technique for approximating the global optimum of a given 
function to solve the VDVD problem. As stated in TABLE I, 
X is a solution of VDVD problem corresponding to the state in 
SA. We define  as the state space and ( )H X as the energy at 
state X . Let T be the temperature, which controls the rate of 
progress of SA, and the probability making the transition from 
the current state X to a candidate new state X  is specified by an 
acceptance probability function in the metropolis algorithm 
[12], 
  
1, ( ) ( )
, ( ) ( )
exp ,
T
if H X H X
P X X H X H X
otherwise
T
 

     
 
 
 (13) 
The concrete SA-VDVD algorithm is presented as follows. 
 
Algorithm 2 SA-VDVD algorithm 
Input：the original graph G , the set of available variants S    
Output: deployment  ,iD W i V   
1:  Initialize the temperature T and number of 
iterations L for each T , randomly generate the initial 
state X ; 
2:  for 1:k L do  
3:    Generate a new state X  which is in the state 
space via a random perturbation; 
4:   Calculate the increment of energy ( ) ( )H X H X   ; 
5:    if 0  then 
6:      Accept the state transition from X to X  ; 
7:    else 
8:  Accept the state transition with the probability 
of
( ) ( )
exp
H X H X
T
  
 
 
; 
9:    end if  
10: end for  
11:  if the cease criterion is attained then 
12:    stop the process and return the optimal solution; 
13:  else 
14:    Cut down the temperature T , and then go back to Line 
2; 
15:  end if 
 
The efficiency and efficacy of SA algorithm depend on the 
cooling scheme parameters including the value of the initial 
temperature, number of iterations for each temperature, and the 
initial state. Several methods have been proposed to set it. Out 
of those methods, we adopt ANDYMARK [13] – an analytical 
method, which can obtain high quality solution while with less 
effort to tune the parameters of the cooling scheme for the SA 
algorithm. Let S be the solution space of the problem solved 
and
iS
V be the neighborhood set of
i
S . The maximum cost 
deteriorations can be written 
as     
max
, ,
iV j i j S i
H Max H S H S S V S S       . The 
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initial temperature is
  
max
max
-
ln
V
A V
H
P H


. In general, 
 
max
1
A V
P H  . Here let  
max
=0.9
A V
P H . Let
iS
V be the 
neighborhood size. Let  R jP S be the rejection probability and 
generally the value is close to zero. The number of iterations for 
each temperature is   ln
iR j S
L P S V . 
Typical cooling schedule includes the linear cooling 
schedule [11] and the geometric cooling scheme [14]. The 
authors in [15] show no significant difference in performance 
between linear and geometric schemes. We embrace the 
geometric cooling schedule as shown in Equation (14), 
 ( 1) ( ), 1,2, ,T T        (14) 
where is a constant representing the cooling factor and the 
value is approximate to 1,  indicates the number of cooling. In 
our scenario, we set 0.95  .  
B. GSSA-VDVD algorithm 
In this section, we first analyze the computational 
complexity of the proposed SA-VDVD algorithm. We define a 
parameter K which reflects the external loop and inner loop in 
the process of SA. According to Algorithm 1, the 
computational complexity for calculating the EIR, which 
comes from calculating connected component, can be 
approximated to
3
( )O n . Thus, the total computational 
complexity can be expressed as
3
( )O Kn . Generally, the 
parameter K is relatively constant in the process of SA. It is 
obvious that the computational complexity will significantly 
rise with the increase of network size n . When the network 
size n increases to a certain value, it is not practical to obtain 
the deployment scheme via the proposed SA-VDVD algorithm. 
Therefore, it is urgent to seek a scheme which can effectively 
decrease the computational complexity while maintaining the 
performance. 
To address this problem, we devise a Graph 
Segmentation-based Simulated Annealing Vulnerability-aware 
Diverse Variants Deployment (GSSA-VDVD) algorithm 
drawing lessons from the graph theory. The idea of this scheme 
is to transform the network with large size into smaller 
networks and then color them respectively. To do so, there are 2 
alternatives including graph clustering [16] and graph 
partitioning [17]. Graph clustering algorithms attempt to find 
peninsulas of connectivity, while graph partitioning algorithms 
try to split the network into balanced partitions.  
The concrete GSSA-VDVD algorithm is shown as follows. 
 
Algorithm 3 GSSA-VDVD algorithm 
Input: the original graph G , the number of divided 
components l , the set of available variantsV  
Output: deployment  ,iD W i V   
1:  obtain subgraph , 1,2, ,
i
G i l by cutting the 
original graph G into l partitions via graph partitioning 
or graph clustering algorithm; 
2:  generate the set of node pairs N in which nodes in a 
node pair are adjacent and belong to different subgraph; 
3:  for each
i
G do 
4:  obtain deployment
i
D corresponding to 
subgraph
i
G by executing SA-VDVD algorithm; 
5:  end for  
6:  for each element in N do  
7:    if nodes belong to the same variant then  
8:      update the variant deployed on one node of the 
node pair; 
9:    end if  
10: end for  
11: obtain the final deployment D by the integration of 
different , 1,2, ,
i
D i l   
 
Graph 
partition
Adjacency 
processing 
Subgraph 
coloring 
Diversity 
deployment for 
each subgraph
partition
Avert defective 
edges
Integration 
Final 
deployment
Fig. 6 The workflow of GSSA-VDVD algorithm  
 
As shown in Fig. 6, the GSSA-VDVD algorithm consists of 
four phases: graph partition phase (line 1-2 in Algorithm 3), 
subgraph coloring phase (line 3-5 in Algorithm 3), adjacency 
processing phase (line 6-10 in Algorithm 3) and integration 
phase (line 11 in Algorithm 3). 
In the graph partition phase, the original graph is divided into 
multiple subgraphs by executing the graph cutting algorithm. 
Furthermore, the information of adjacency nodes between 
different subgraphs is preserved in a specified set. Then, 
SA-VDVD algorithm is executed to deploy diverse variants for 
each subgraph in the subgraph coloring phase. Once the first 
two phases are complete, the initial deployment scheme for the 
entire graph is said to be achieved. Up until this point, it seems 
that all the work has been done. In fact, the initial scheme is not 
the desired one, because there may exist defective links 
between subgraphs. To eliminate these links, the adjacency 
processing phase is performed in which we can recolor one 
node of these defective links. Ultimately, the respective 
deployment
i
D for each subgraph is integrated as the final 
deployment scheme. 
C. Complexity analysis of GSSA-VDVD  
The main questions that one may ask about the effectiveness 
and performance of GSSA-VDVD are, why can the proposed 
scheme decrease the computational complexity? And which 
one is better? To answer these questions, we will first introduce 
several theorems as follows. 
Theorem 1：With a given number of divided components l , 
the computational complexity can attain the minimum if and 
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only if the size for each component is equal. 
Proof: Assume that the network is divided 
into l components, let
i
x be the size of the ith component, then 
the total computational complexity can be expressed 
as
3
1
( )
l
ii
O K x
 , and our target is to minimize it under 
constraint condition. Naturally, we can establish the following 
formula,  
 
3
1
1
min
l
ii
l
ii
x
subject to x n





 (15) 
where n denotes the number of nodes in the network. We can 
transform the problem to the following via Lagrange Multiplier 
Approach. First Lagrange function
1 2
( , , , )
l
F x x x  is defined 
as follows, 
  31 2 1 1( , , , )
l l
l i ii i
F x x x x x n 
 
      (16) 
where  is the Lagrange multiplier. Computing partial 
derivative towards equation(16), then we can obtain the 
following equations, 
 
21 2
1
1
21 2
2
2
21 2
1 2
1
( , , , )
3 0
( , , , )
3 0
( , , , )
3 0
( , , , )
0
l
l
l
l
l
ll
ii
F x x x
x
x
F x x x
x
x
F x x x
x
x
F x x x
x n







 

  


  


  


  


  (17) 
Then we can get the final result by solving(17), 
 1 2 l
nx x x
l
      (18) 
  
3 3
2min 1 2
( , , )
l
n nf x x x l
l l
    (19) 
From the results, we can conclude 
that
3
1 2 1
( , , )
l
l ii
f x x x x

 can get the minimum value
3
2
n
l
if 
and only if 1 2 l
nx x x
l
    .  
The results indicate that graph partitioning algorithms can 
attain lower computational complexity than graph clustering 
algorithms on the same network topology. This is because that 
clustering algorithms may produce unbalanced partitions 
resulting in high computation cost. 
Theorem 2：The computational complexity of network 
divided into l components will decrease by a factor 
of 21
l
compared with the original network. 
Proof: In the derivation process of the above-mentioned 
Theorem 1, we can easily get the relationship between the 
number of components l and the computational complexity. 
Note that the computational complexity here indicates the 
minimal computing cost for a given number of components l .  
For the original network, the computational complexity can 
be expressed as
3
( )O Kn . 
For the divided network, the computational complexity can 
be expressed as    
3
3
2min 1
l
ii
KnO K x O
l
 . 
Thus, we can get the relationship of computational 
complexity of these two schemes, 
    
33
3
2 2min 1
( )l
ii
O KnKnO K x O
l l
    (20) 
It is clear that the computational complexity of network divided 
into l components will decrease by a factor of 21
l
compared 
with the original network. Therefore, we can conclude that the 
more the number of divided components l , the lower the 
computational complexity. Nevertheless, we should not select 
the tremendous l for its performance degradation. As for the 
suitable l , it is difficult to derive from rigorous theory. 
Alternatively, we can determine the value of l through 
experiments and no more details will be shown here. 
VI. EVALUATION 
In this section, the proposed SA-VDVD algorithm is 
evaluated in terms of various aspects, namely coloring 
algorithms, compromised probability, inaccurate information 
and topology size. We organize this section as follows. First, 
the experimental setup used in our experiment is introduced in 
subsection A. Then, the comparison algorithms are presented in 
subsection B. Finally, in subsection C, we discuss the 
simulation results. 
A. Experiment Setup  
In our evaluation, we use Cenic topology [18] and Interoute1. 
Note that the topology is a network device-level topology, in 
which each node and edge correspond to a network device and 
link between network devices, respectively. The topology 
information is shown in TABLE II. 
TABLE II  
NETWORK TOPOLOGY USED IN OUR EVALUATION 
Topology Nodes Edges 
Cenic 51 91 
Interoute 110 158 
B. Comparison Algorithms 
The comparison algorithms are introduced below: 
(1) randomized coloring: randomly assigns a variant from the 
set of variants to each node. 
(2) color swapping [19]: each node performs a local search 
amongst its immediate neighbors to determine if switching 
to a new variant would decrease the number of locally 
defective edges. 
(3) SA-VDVD: it assigns a variant to each node based on SA. 
 
1 More information about the Interoute topology can be found at 
www.topology-zoo.org 
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(a) The results of defense capacity on Cenic topology 
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(b) The results of defense capacity on Interoute topology 
Fig. 7 EIR under the different number of variants  
 
(4) GSSA-VDVD: it divides the given network into numerous 
smaller subnets and then assigns a variant to each node 
based on SA. 
The experimental results from these algorithms are stochastic. 
To eliminate this effect, the Monte Carlo method is adopted to 
reflect the final results. For a given coloring algorithm, each 
value in our evaluation is obtained from the following equation, 
 
1
1
i
K
Di
R R
K 
    (21) 
where
i
D represents the ith deployment for a certain coloring 
algorithm. K is the number of Monte Carlo simulations. In the 
experiment, K is 200. 
C. Simulation results 
1) The impact of coloring algorithms 
In this section, we compare the defense capacity against 
malicious packets attacks achieved by various algorithms on 
the same network topology. Fig. 7 shows the results achieved 
by the different algorithms measured using the EIR on Cenic 
and Interoute, respectively. With the increase number of 
variants, the RIR will decrease for each algorithm. Besides, the 
proposed SA-VDVD algorithm clearly outperforms other 
coloring algorithms by 35% in terms of the EIR, as the 
proposed SA-VDVD algorithm considers the spread across the 
distinct nodes. As a good result, it can restrain the propagation 
of malicious packets attacks to the greatest extent. Note that 
when the number of variants is 2,  
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(a) The results of network robustness on Cenic topology 
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(b) The results of network robustness on Interoute topology 
 
Fig. 8 EPC under the different number of variants  
 
the defense performance of the proposed algorithm is similar to 
that of color swapping but superior to randomized coloring. 
This is explained by the fact that the proposed algorithm and 
color swapping both aim to make the adjacent nodes 
heterogeneous under this scenario.  
There is no doubt that the infected nodes can impact on the 
network robustness. The network robustness means that the 
property of the network keeping connected in the case of a 
failure. In such a case, Pair Connectivity (PC) is adopted as the 
metric to measure the network robustness. PC is defined as the 
following equation, 
 
 
1
2
1
1
2
num
i ii
n
comp comp
U
C




  (22) 
where 2
n
C is the number of all node pairs,
i
comp is 
the ith component and num is the number of components in the 
network. Considering all the possible initial injected nodes, we 
define a metric named Expected Pair Connectivity (EPC) in the 
following equation, 
 
1
1 n
kk
EPC U
n 
    (23) 
where
k
U indicates the PC in the case that node k is initially 
injected. It is worth mentioning that we assume the probability 
for each node initially injected is equal for the sake of 
simplicity. We also assume that there are 6 variants in total. Fig. 
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8 shows the EPC using different algorithms against the number 
of  
0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
The simultaneously compromised probability
E
IR
 
 
randomized coloring
color swapping
SA-VDVD 
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(b) The results on Interoute topology 
 
Fig. 9 EIR under the different simultaneously compromised probabilities for 
different coloring algorithms 
 
variants. As per the figure, the EPC increases as the number of 
variants rises for each algorithm. Obviously, the proposed 
SA-VDVD algorithm outperforms other algorithms for a 
certain number of variants. Moreover, with the increase of the 
number of variants, the EPC for all algorithms will be gradually 
closed.  
2) The impact of compromised probability 
In this section, we investigate the effect from the probability 
of compromised events on the defense capability. Next, we take 
an example to illustrate the effect. The related parameter is 
configured as follows. Assume that there are 3 variants in total 
which can be used in our coloring algorithms. For the clarity 
purpose, assume that the compromised events comprised only 
of two types. One is the nodes with the same variants are 
compromised, and the other is the two variants in the variants 
set that can be compromised simultaneously. We study the 
probability that two variants are simultaneously compromised 
varying from 0 to 0.2.  
Fig. 9 shows the defense capability using different coloring 
algorithms against the probability that two variants are 
simultaneously compromised on Cenic and Interoute 
respectively. As can be observed, for each algorithm, the EIR 
increases as the probability that two variants are compromised 
rises. Obviously, with the increase of the probability that two 
variants are compromised, the spread ability of the malicious  
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Fig. 10 EIR obtained by different information under the different probability 
deviations 
 
packets attack will improve across the distinct nodes. As a 
result, more nodes will be infected. Moreover, the proposed 
SA-VDVD algorithm outperforms the other coloring 
algorithms and randomized coloring performs the worst in the 
case of any probability. When the probability that two variants 
are compromised is relatively low, the goodness of the 
proposed SA-VDVD algorithm is not fully clear. In this case, 
spread ability of the malicious packets attack across the distinct 
nodes is not powerful. Thus, defense effectiveness is similar 
among the algorithms except for randomized coloring. As the 
probability that two variants are compromised increases, the 
advantage of the proposed SA-VDVD algorithm turns to be 
clear. In such a case, spread ability across distinct nodes will 
increase quickly. Hence, the SA-VDVD algorithm considering 
common vulnerabilities can restrain the propagation of 
malicious packets attacks more effectively than other coloring 
algorithms without considering common vulnerabilities. 
3) The impact of inaccurate information 
  So far, we have assumed that the probabilities for all the 
compromised events are priori known for us. In real scenarios, 
these probabilities could be obtained via two ways, one is 
expert opinion and the other is real world statistics. However, 
both techniques cannot be completely accurate. In this section, 
we study the case that the deployment is based on inaccurate 
information. 
We use the following equation to depict the inaccurate 
information,  
 ( ) ( )
i i i
P e P e      (24) 
where ( )
i
P e indicates the available probability, ( )
i
P e indicates 
the realistic probability and
i
 indicates the deviation between 
the available probability and the realistic probability for a 
compromised event
i
e . In this section, the evaluated probability 
refers to the probability that two variants are simultaneously 
compromised. The probability deviation is set ranging from 
-0.1 to 0.1 with the common difference 0.05.  
Fig. 10 shows the EIR obtained by different information 
using the proposed SA-VDVD algorithm against the 
probability deviation that two variants are compromised. As is 
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seen in the figure, the deviation value between accurate and 
inaccurate increases as the absolute value of probability  
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Fig. 11 EIR under the different number of divided subnets for SA-VDVD and 
GSSA-VDVD  
 
deviation increases. The explanation is that the obtained 
deployment with inaccurate information can be not optimal.  
4) The impact of the topology size 
As stated in Section V, the computation time becomes 
excessive when the size of the network is large. In this section, 
we explore this particular situation in the aspect of defense 
performance and computational complexity. Assume that there 
are 3 available variants. Simulations are conducted on Interoute 
topology where we first compare the defense performance of 
different deployment schemes on the same network topology. 
Fig. 11 shows the EIR versus the divided subnets for 
SA-VDVD and GSSA-VDVD. As can be seen in Fig. 11, the 
deployment based on SA-VDVD algorithm clearly outperforms 
the deployment based on GSSA-VDVD algorithm. 
Furthermore, as the number of divided components increases, 
the EIR will increase simultaneously. When the number of 
divided subnets is relatively small, the performance 
degradation based on GSSA-VDVD algorithm is not obvious.  
Afterward, we investigate the relationship of computational 
complexity for different algorithms. To reflect the compared 
results clearly, normalization method is adopted. More 
specifically, the computational complexity of deployment 
based on SA-VDVD algorithm is selected as the benchmark. 
For the other scheme, the computational complexity is 
calculated as the ratio of the actual computational complexity 
of a certain scheme to that of the benchmark. Fig. 12 shows the 
computational complexity versus the number of divided 
subnets for various algorithms. We can observe that the 
deployment based on GSSA-VDVD algorithm has lower 
computational complexity than schemes based on SA-VDVD 
algorithm. Moreover, the computational complexity for the 
deployment scheme based on GSSA-VDVD algorithm will 
decrease rapidly with the increase of the number of divided 
subnets. 
VII. RELATED WORK 
A. Cyber security 
Keeping in view the exponentially increasing cybercrime and 
fraudulent online activities by fraudster, [20] delves into the 
various cyber fraud and probable solutions. B. B. Gupta 
identifies in [21] the emergent research and techniques being 
utilized in the field of cryptology and cyber threat prevention.  
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Fig. 12 Computational complexity under the different divided subnets for 
SA-VDVD and GSSA-VDVD  
 
L. Wang et al. [22] propose a novel compressive sensing 
scheme that supports medical image sampling, compressing, 
encryption and confidentially homomorphic aggregation 
simultaneously. Internet of Things (IoT) provides new types of 
services in order to improve everyday life [23]. [24] describes 
challenges that threaten IoT diffusion and presents open 
research questions. [25] surveys the security challenges of the 
integration of IoT and cloud computing. [26] presents a 
comprehensive survey of secured web application by 
identifying numerous serious threats faced by several-related 
organizations. [27] presents a cloud-based framework that 
thwarts the DOM-based XSS vulnerabilities caused due to the 
injection of advanced HTML5 attack vectors in the HTML5 
web applications. 
B. Diversity 
Diversity has long been recognized as a promising solution to 
improve the resilience of a software system against various 
vulnerabilities. In fact, diversity is no longer a new thing, and it 
has been extensively applied in a variety of fields such as 
biology and organic systems [19]. Here, we only investigate its 
application in computer and network context. At the beginning, 
design diversity has been investigated in fault tolerance for a 
long time. A typical case is N-Variant programming which 
builds 2N  functionally equivalent programs and detects the 
faulty version by comparing the output results [28]. Then the 
N-Variant system extends N-version programming to detect 
intrusions [29]. Apparently, it is an important premise to 
generate diversity. So far, substantial literature adopting 
randomization techniques has been put forward to 
auto-generate diversity [30][31][32]. Recently, from the point 
of view of application fields, diversity has been extensively 
used in some new scenarios such as cloud computing security 
[33], Moving Target Defense (MTD) [34] and network routing 
[35][36][37]. 
The aforementioned studies are basically directed against a 
point defense which focuses on the security of network node. 
To achieve the global network defense, inspired by the 
survivability through heterogeneity philosophy, Zhang et al. [9] 
first propose a novel survivability paradigm named 
heterogeneous networking to improve the survivability of a 
network. In terms of the relationship between diversity and the 
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robustness of a network, Juan Caballero et al. [10] employ a 
graph theoretic approach to explore the benefits of diversity for 
the robustness of a network, where robustness is the property of 
a network staying connected under a software failure. Though 
diversity has been extensively used, most of the existing efforts 
rely on intuitive and imprecise notions of diversity. At a higher 
abstraction level, as a global property of the entire network, 
diversity and its effect on security have been overlooked. 
Zhang et al. [38] model network diversity as a security metric 
by designing and evaluating a series of diversity metrics and 
provide guidelines for the instantiation of the proposed metrics. 
C. Graph Coloring 
As a well-known problem in graph theory, graph coloring 
problem focuses on the assignment of colors to nodes of the 
graph subject to certain constraints [39]. In general, it 
guarantees that two adjacent nodes possess distinct colors. So 
far, graph coloring problem has been extensively used in 
various fields such as curriculum schedule, traffic management 
and network, etc. Here we mainly focus on its application in the 
area of networking. O’Donnell et al. [19] transform the problem 
of limiting the spread of malware via diversity on a network 
topology into the graph coloring problem and propose a series 
of distributed coloring algorithms. Similarly, graph coloring 
problem is adopted in order to study how to maximize the 
robustness of a network via diversity [10]. 
D. Malicious Packets Attack 
The authors in [40] propose a range of attack approaches to 
illustrate that a mal-packet, which only carries specially crafted 
data, can exploit memory-related vulnerabilities and utilize 
existing application codes in a sensor to propagate itself 
without disrupting sensor’s functionality. In [41], the authors 
illustrate the feasibility of launching sensor worms through trial 
experiments on Mica2 motes and investigates the technique of 
software diversity to combat sensor worms.  
To summarize, our work is inspired by existing work of [9, 
10, 18, 40], but, also, different from them. We investigate an 
optimal scheme to restrain the spread of malicious packets 
attack via diversity deployment under a more realistic 
condition, and theoretically formulate it as 
integer-programming. 
VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORKS 
The paper investigated the existing common vulnerabilities 
among different variants which coincides well with the actual 
situation. We, first, devised a quantitative metric reflecting the 
effect on the network brought by the spread of malicious 
packets attacks. Then, we modeled the VDVD problem as an 
integer-programming problem and proposed a SA-VDVD 
algorithm to solve it. In addition, we proposed a GSSA-VDVD 
algorithm to address the high computational complexity as the 
size of network increases. Finally, we performed a series of 
experiments to verify the validity of the proposed algorithms. 
The proposed SA-VDVD algorithm outperformed other 
coloring algorithms by 35% in defense capacity. When variants 
had a low correlation, the superiority of SA-VDVD algorithm 
was not significant. GSSA-VDVD algorithm can effectively 
reduce the computational complexity. 
In future, we intend to study the case where attackers can 
explore more than one vulnerability. 
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